题目：Identity in Public Good Games
摘要：A group's ideals, or norms, can determine whether agents join the group and the behavior of those who join. These ideals can affect the provision of a public good, such as the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Agents have different preference for this public good. Acceptance of climate science confers membership as a "climate insider" creating both "identity utility " and disutility if the member deviates from the group ideal. The group ideal might create a wide but shallow group (one with many members but having little effect on their behavior) or a narrow but deep group. With uniformly distributed preferences, the contribution-maximizing ideal is wide but shallow when there is little heterogeneity, and narrow but deep when heterogeneity is large. The contribution-maximizing ideal also maximizes welfare if the population is large. We also consider general distributions of preferences.
作者简介：Hong Fuhai，新加坡南洋理工大学经济学系助理教授，主要研究兴趣为行为和实验经济学、环境和公共经济，已在Journal of Public Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、American Journal of Agricultural Economics、Structural Change and Economic Dynamics、Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists、Environmental and Resource Economics、Canadian Journal of Economics和Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 等国际权威刊物发表论文多篇，同时也是多家SSCI期刊的匿名审稿人。
题目：E-Commerce Integration and Household Welfare: Evidence from Taobao's 100 Thousand Villages Project in China
内容摘要：Over the past 15 years more than half of China’s population have been connected to, and by, the internet. Despite this astonishing trajectory, we know relatively little about the implications of online integration for the Chinese economy. This paper brings to bear a unique collection of microdata in combination with a randomized controlled trial that we conduct in collaboration with the Chinese internet company Alibaba, who also own the dominant Chinese online consumer shopping platform TaoBao. Alibaba’s biggest capital investment over the period 2010-2020 is TaoBao’s so called 100k Village Program (TB100k). This program builds the necessary logistics to ship products to and sell products from 100 thousand previously unconnected villages in China. As part of this operation, technicians install and advertise a TaoBao terminal at a central village store where households can buy and sell products through the store’s TaoBao account. We were given authorization to randomly advance the participation of 60 villages from a list of 100 villages whose installations were originally earmarked for a later wave. Using this intervention in combination with survey data that we collect and the online transaction records that we obtain from Alibaba, this paper sets out to empirically estimate the household welfare gains from online integration in China. The richness of the data allow us to estimate a general expression of the change in household welfare due to the TB100k, and to decompose that effect into several distinct channels.